Multi-Sender Persuasion -- A Computational Perspective

Safwan HossainTonghan WangTao LinYiling ChenDavid C. ParkesHaifeng Xu

Safwan HossainTonghan WangTao LinYiling ChenDavid C. ParkesHaifeng Xu

Feb 2024

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摘要原文

We consider multiple senders with informational advantage signaling to convince a single self-interested actor towards certain actions. Generalizing the seminal Bayesian Persuasion framework, such settings are ubiquitous in computational economics, multi-agent learning, and machine learning with multiple objectives. The core solution concept here is the Nash equilibrium of senders' signaling policies. Theoretically, we prove that finding an equilibrium in general is PPAD-Hard; in fact, even computing a sender's best response is NP-Hard. Given these intrinsic difficulties, we turn to finding local Nash equilibria. We propose a novel differentiable neural network to approximate this game's non-linear and discontinuous utilities. Complementing this with the extra-gradient algorithm, we discover local equilibria that Pareto dominates full-revelation equilibria and those found by existing neural networks. Broadly, our theoretical and empirical contributions are of interest to a large class of economic problems.