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Multiplayer War of Attrition with Asymmetric Private Information

Hongcheng LiJialu Zhang
Feb 2024
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摘要原文
This paper studies a war of attrition game in the setting of public good provision that combines three elements: (i) multiple players, (ii) incomplete information, and (iii) ex-ante asymmetry. In the unique equilibrium, asymmetry leads to a stratified behavior pattern where one player provides the public good instantly with a positive probability while each of the other players has a player-specific strict waiting time, before which even his highest type will not provide the good. Comparative statics show that a player with less patience, lower cost of provision, and higher reputation in value (expressed in a form of hazard rate) provides the good type-wise uniformly faster. In large societies, the cost of delay is mainly determined by the highest type of the instant-exit player.
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