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Optimal Delegation in Markets for Matching with Signaling

Seungjin HanAlex SamYoungki Shin
Mar 2023
摘要
This paper studies a delegation problem faced by the planner who wants toregulate receivers' reaction choices in markets for matching between receiversand senders with signaling. We provide a noble insight into the planner'swillingness to delegate and the design of optimal (reaction) intervaldelegation as a solution to the planner's general mechanism design problem. Therelative heterogeneity of receiver types and the productivity of the sender'signal are crucial in deriving optimal interval delegation in the presence ofthe trade-off between matching efficiency and signaling costs.
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